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I. INTRODUCTION
A defaulting spouse may find a powerful and effective defense
to a creditor's entry of judgment in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
("ECOA" or "the Act")1 and the accompanying federal regulation
("Regulation B").2 The defense arises when a married applicant
enters a financial institution seeking a loan, and even though the
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq. (1994 ed.).
2. This regulation was issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1996).
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applicant is unquestionably creditworthy, the creditor requires that
the applicant's spouse co-sign the loan as a guaranteeing spouse. The
financial institution has just violated the ECOA by discriminating
against the applicant on account of the applicant's marital status. If
the original applicant later defaults on the loan, the creditor will then
pursue a judgment against the guaranteeing spouse. Will the
guaranteeing spouse be held liable for the underlying debt
notwithstanding the fact that the additional signature was obtained
illegally? Courts facing this question have struggled to come to a
definitive answer as to whether a guaranteeing spouse may apply the
ECOA as a defense to contractual liability.
Congress passed the ECOA in 19743 to prohibit credit dis-
crimination based on gender or marital status.4 Congress's goals were
to protect married women from discriminatory credit practices 5 and to
provide all applicants the opportunity to establish individual credit.6
The provision was expanded in 19767 to prohibit any type of credit
discrimination. 8 Even though the original purpose of the Act was to
prohibit a creditor from discriminating against women by requiring
wives to obtain their husbands' co-signatures, the literal language of
the Act has been used in recent years by both husbands and wives in
3. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974), codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994 ed.) ("ECOA").
4. Federal Reserve System, Proposed Rules to Regulation B of the ECOA, 60 Fed. Reg.
20436, 20437 (April 26, 1995) (presenting proposed amendments to 12 C.F.R. Part 202) C'April
Proposals to Regulation B").
5. For examples of discrimination against women before Congress passed the ECOA,
including creditors' applying different criteria to women when making decisions of creditworthi-
ness, see Elwin Griffith, The Quest for Fair Credit Reporting and Equal Credit Opportunity in
Consumer Transactions, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 37, 41 (1994). See also Anne J. Geary, Equal
Credit Opportunity-An Analysis of Regulation B, 31 Bus. Law. 1641, 1641 (1976) (stating
creditors are often unwilling to extend credit to a married woman without her husband's
guarantee).
6. See Anderson v. United Financial Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982) C(The
purpose of the ECOA is to eradicate credit discrimination waged against women, especially
married women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider for individual credit.");
Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co., Associates, Inc., 605 F.2d 566, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(noting that main purpose of the Act was to eliminate discrimination against women, "especially
married women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider apart from their husbands as
individually worthy of credit.").
7. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251
(1976), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a).
8. The ECOA states that "[iut shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against
any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction.., on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age .... 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). See also 12
C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (1996) ('CThe purpose of this regulation is to promote the availability of credit
to all creditworthy applicants ....").
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an attempt to declare underlying notes or guaranties void and unen-
forceable upon an ECOA violation.9
The most common example of an ECOA violation today results
from a creditor requiring the husband to obtain the signature of his
wife even though the husband is individually creditworthy. Another
example of an ECOA violation occurs in the commercial lending
context. The lender may require the personal guarantee of an owner
or officer of the business, often the husband, and then also require the
wife to co-sign the guaranty as additional protection.
Either situation violates Regulation B, which specifically pro-
vides:
Except as provided in this paragraph, a creditor shall not require the signature
of an applicant's spouse or other person, other than a joint applicant, on any
credit instrument if the applicant qualifies under the creditor's standards of
creditworthiness for the amount and terms of the credit requested.10
In the last decade, defaulting spouses have increasingly cited this
portion of Regulation B as a possible defense to payment of their
obligations, claiming that the creditor discriminated against credit-
worthy husbands by requiring their wives' signatures. Because the
legislative intent when enacting the ECOA was to protect married
women instead of married men,' courts have disagreed as to the
whether husbands can even claim that they have been discriminated
against, and therefore, whether their co-signing wives can seek dis-
missal of their obligations.
9 To many commentators, the assertion of an ECOA violation by a guaranteeing wife
distorts the Act's intended use, as the discrimination in that scenario is not against the woman
but against the husband. See, for example, Andrew B. Lustigman and Alicia M. Serafty, The
Equal Credit Opportunity Act as a Defense Against Payment: How Lenders Can Strike Back,
111 Bank. L. J. 444, 447 (1994) ("[B]orrowers and guarantors are increasingly asserting claims
or defenses under ECOA-not to... remedy past 'discrimination'-but as a last ditch effort to
prevent a lender from obtaining a quick entry of judgment against them"); CMF Virginia Land,
L.P. v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90, 96 (E.D. Va. 1992) (stating that the ECOA was enacted to
protect women and that voiding a guaranty signed by a male borrower was not the intended use
of the ECOA).
10. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1).
11. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the House Committee on
Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1974) ('Subcommittee Hearings"). The
Subcommittee gave special thanks to the National Commission on Consumer Finance for
bringing "dramatic attention ... to the issues of women and credit in hearings almost exactly 2
years ago." As a result of this attention, the Subcommittee became determined to pass federal
legislation that would eliminate the problems of gender-based credit discrimination. Id. In fact,
speakers in the 1974 Subcommittee Hearings suggested that the bill should not address classes
other than women, such as race and religion, because the 1972 report produced no evidence of
this type of discrimination in the credit industry. Id. at 317-18.
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The ECOA provides several remedies to an aggrieved credit
applicant, including the right to bring private lawsuits against those
creditors in violation. The far-reaching potential effects of these
remedies form one of the most problematic and unsettled areas of the
Act. In addition to monetary damages, section 1691e(c) of the ECOA
empowers courts to "grant such equitable and declaratory relief as is
necessary to enforce the requirements imposed under this title."12
The dispute among courts arises when a creditor clearly violates the
ECOA by requiring the signature of the spouse of a creditworthy
applicant, the original guarantor defaults on the loan, and the credi-
tor subsequently pursues a judgment against the guaranteeing
spouse. In this situation, some courts cite section 1691e(c) as author-
ity for relieving the spouse who was forced to co-sign the guaranty
from any future obligation, 13 while other courts refuse because the
statute does not specifically provide for such a remedy. 14
The fact that some courts look to the "equitable and declara-
tory relief" provision in order to release the guaranteeing spouse from
any obligation, while others courts do not, creates an area of unsettled
law which is still developing. As a result of the inconsistencies, it is
nearly impossible to predict what type of remedy the court will impose
in a specific jurisdiction.' 5 The unanswered question, and the issue
addressed in this Note, is whether a guaranteeing spouse can claim a
violation of the ECOA as grounds for dismissal from the collection
action, or whether the guaranty remains intact, leaving a compulsory
counterclaim as the guaranteeing spouse's only available form of
relief. This Note will then explore the legislative history of the
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c).
13. See American Security Bank, N.A. v. York, 1992 WL 237375 *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 1992)
(rendering the underlying debt void does not fail as a defense as a matter of law given the broad
remedial language of § 1691e(c)); In re Remington, 19 B.R. 718, 720 (D. Colo. 1982) (supporting
defensive use of ECOA violation as grounds for recoupment).
14. See Brinson, 806 F. Supp. at 95-96 (declining to invalidate underlying guaranty by
"reading between the lines" of the statute); Diamond v. Union Bank and Trust of Bartlesuille,
776 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (holding that there is no statutory authority allowing courts
to render an instrument void upon ECOA violation).
15. When both husband and wife assert the spousal defense as co-defendants, and the
creditor-plaintiff seeks summary judgment, courts have generally not allowed the original
guarantor to claim a violation of the ECOA as a defense to payment. See, for example, Brinson,
806 F. Supp. at 96; Diamond, 776 F. Supp. at 543-44. One court found it particularly untenable
to void a couple's guaranty when the husband claimed that he was forced to obtain his wife's
signature as a guarantor. Brinson, 806 F. Supp at 96. But see Remington, 19 B.R. at 719. The
Remington court strictly construed the ECOA's text, noting that although the Act may have
been promulgated to protect women and other minorities, the plain statutory language bars
discrimination against any applicant. As a result, this court concluded that an ECOA violation,
even against a husband, may "taint the entire obligation." Id.
1290 [Vol. 49:1287
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ECOA 6 and analyze the inconsistent results of various courts. 17 The
Note will recommend an approach that not only follows legislative
intent and the literal meaning of the statute, but also effectuates
Congress's goal in balancing the credit industry's need for protection
against the borrower's right to be free from discriminatory credit
practices.'
8
II. PURPOSE AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF THE EQUAL CREDIT
OPPORTUNITY ACT ("ECOA")
A. Legislative History
In the early 1970s Congress conducted several inquiries and
hearings in response to widespread allegations of discriminatory
credit practices.' 9 As a result of a 1972 report released by the
National Commission on Consumer Finance exposing the widespread
problem of gender-based credit discrimination, Congress's focus of
redress quickly centered on married women, who were consistently
required to obtain the signatures of their husbands in order to receive
credit from financial institutions. 20 The original provision of the
ECOA in 1974 only barred discrimination based on gender and
marital status and prohibited creditors from asking any questions
aimed at ascertaining an applicant's marital status.2' The inability of
creditors to compile this information was thought to prevent creditors
from using it as a means to discriminate. 22
16. See Part II.
17. See Part III.
18. See Part IV.
19. The National Commission on Consumer Finance reported evidence of discrimination
against women on a widespread basis in the credit industry. Griffith, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. at 41
(cited in note 5).
20. Subcommittee Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 27 (cited in note 11). Additionally, in
1974 the United States Commission on Civil Rights studied mortgage lending in Hartford,
Connecticut. The study found that mortgage procedures permitted opportunities for
discriminatory credit decisions, as well as nearly requiring discrimination against women.
Under the criteria used by mortgage lenders in Hartford, women were automatically considered
credit risks. Id. at 247. See also Geary, 31 Bus. Law. at 1652 (stating that the requirement of a
signature from the applicant's spouse is common practice in some segments of the credit
industry) (cited in note 5).
21. Before Congress enacted the ECOA, women were forced to answer questions on credit
application forms that addressed age, sex, race, religion, birth control practices, and child-
bearing intentions. Susan Smith Blakely, Credit Opportunity for Women: The ECOA and Its
Effects, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 655, 656.
22. April Proposals to Regulation B, 60 Fed. Reg. at 20437 (cited in note 4).
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Evidence of credit discrimination in the United States was not
limited to sex and marital status, however, and Congress reacted by
expanding the Act to its present scope. In 1976, Congress amended
the ECOA to prohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion,
and national origin, as well as the original classes of gender and mari-
tal status.23 Additionally, the current Act prohibits discriminatory
credit practices at all stages of the credit transaction, including any
extensions of credit.24 The broad prohibition differs from other areas
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act in that it applies to business
and commercial transactions, as well as to any individual who regu-
larly extends credit.25 No creditor, large or small, is immune from the
requirements imposed by the ECOA.
B. Statutory Scheme
Even though the ECOA contains broad anti-discrimination
language, it is Regulation B that contains the specific protections
afforded a spousal guarantor. 26  Only those persons deemed
"applicants" under Regulation B, however, may seek redress. As of
January 1, 1986, Congress expanded the definition of "applicant" to
include any person who may become contractually liable for an exten-
sion of credit,27 including "guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar
parties."28 Under the previous statute, which had denied standing to
this group until 1986, guaranteeing spouses whose signatures were
obtained in violation of Regulation B could not sue as "aggrieved
applicants," and were therefore left without recourse. Consequently,
the question of whether the court should dismiss a guaranteeing
spouse whose signature was illegally obtained from a creditor's claim
has only arisen as a result of the 1986 amendments.
23. Id.
24. See Revision of the Board's Equal Credit Regulation: An Overview, 71 Fed. Res. Bull.
913, 914 (Dec. 1985) ("Equal Credit Regulation Revision"). The credit transaction includes
applying for credit, credit investigations, creditworthiness standards, obtaining signatures,
credit reporting, and collection of debts. See also Stern v. Espirito Santo Bank of Florida, 791 F.
Supp. 865, 869 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that a lender must reevaluate an applicant's
creditworthiness when extending additional credit); Official Staff Commentaries, 12 C.F.R., Part
202, Supp. I, § 202.7(d)(6) (1996).
25. Equal Credit Regulation Revision, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 914 (cited in note 24). The
ECOA is not limited to banks and financial institutions. See also 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(1).
26. Equal Credit Regulation Revision, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 914 (cited in note 24). The
ECOA is implemented through regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board.
27. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e). "Applicant means any person who requests or who has received
an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may become
contractually liable regarding an extension of credit." Id.
28. Id.
[Vol. 49:12871292
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The real heart of the protections afforded by the ECOA and
Regulation B is section 202.7(d), which provides guidance as to when
a creditor may require an additional signature on a guaranty.
Generally, a creditor may not require the signature of an applicant's
spouse or any other person if the applicant is individually
creditworthy. 29  It may not seem clear at first why asking for an
additional signature is considered discriminatory since the creditor is
only protecting itself from default.30 The practice is discriminatory,
however, because an application becomes a joint application upon the
signature of two people, denying the individual applicant the
opportunity to establish an individual credit rating. A similarly
creditworthy and unmarried applicant would have received the loan
without the penalty of an additional signature being required.
Of course there are exceptions to the general rule. If a creditor
decides that the applicant does not qualify under the creditor's own
standards of creditworthiness, then the creditor may require an addi-
tional party to co-sign the instrument.31 Congress makes clear, how-
ever, that even though some additional signature may be required in
order to protect the creditor, the creditor may not specifically require
that it be the spouse who signs in this type of situation.32
The creditor may require the signature of a guaranteeing
spouse if the applicant requests unsecured credit and relies upon
29. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1).
30. Many people may not even be aware that financial institutions and other creditors are
legally precluded by the ECOA from asking a spouse to co-sign a credit agreement except under
specific circumstances (for instance, when the spouse's assets are being used to determine the
applicant's creditworthiness). This Act has applications to all persons who may someday seek
credit.
31. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5). Additionally, the Official Staff Commentaries to Regulation B
specifically state that a creditor may not automatically require the spouse of a corporate officer
of a closely held corporation to co-sign the instrument, even though the officer's personal
guaranty of the corporate loan is required. The Commentary continues by stating that an
additional signature may be necessary after evaluating the financial circumstances of an officer,
and that this signature may be that of the spouse in "appropriate circumstances." A blanket
policy requiring the spouse to sign as a guarantor will likely result in an ECOA claim later,
either as an affirmative claim, or as a defense to payment. Official Staff Commentaries, 12
C.F.R., Part 202, Supp. I, § 202.7(d)(6).
32. If the applicant is not independently creditworthy, the regulation states:
(5) Additional parties. If, under a creditor's standards of creditworthiness, the personal
liability of an additional party is necessary to support the extension of the credit re-
quested, a creditor may request a cosigner, guarantor, or the like. The applicanes
spouse may serve as an additional party, but the creditor shall not require that the
spouse be the additional party.
12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d) (emphasis added). When an applicant does not meet the creditor's
standards for creditworthiness, a creditor typically makes its mistake by specifying that the co-
guarantor must be the applicant's spouse. Griffith, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. at 91 (cited in note 5).
But see Ramsdell v. Bowles, 64 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that a lender may require that
the spouse guarantee the instrument if the applicant is not individually creditworthy).
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property that is jointly owned with the spouse.33 This signature,
however, can only be used to create a valid security interest in the
property upon default or death, and cannot impose personal liability
upon the spouse for the entire debt.34 A creditor must always evalu-
ate the form of ownership of any property offered by an applicant
before demanding any additional signatures. 35 If a financial institu-
tion or other creditor fails to perform this evaluation, potential ECOA
violations will likely arise, even if the applicant is later deemed to be
uncreditworthy, proving the additional signature of a guarantor
would ultimately have been necessary.
The creditor may also require the signature of another person,
including the applicant's spouse, if collateral is required as a condi-
tion to the extension of credit and the creditor reasonably believes the
extra signature to be necessary under state law to obtain the property
being offered as security.3 6 This includes "an instrument to create a
valid lien, pass clear title, waive inchoate rights or assign earnings. 37
For instance, some states require both spouses to sign a document to
create a lien on specific property. In such states, the creditor must in
the credit agreement ensure that the obligation of the non-applicant
spouse is nonrecourse unless the spouse has voluntarily agreed to
assume the obligation for the underlying debt.3 8 Otherwise, the
blanket signature would obligate the non-applicant spouse to the
entire debt instead of simply releasing any claim to the specific
property.
33. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(2).
34. Id.
35. The Federal Reserve Board recently released proposed amendments and additions to
this section of the Official Staff Commentary to Regulation B. One amendment to the
Commentary would clarify that:
Where an individual applicant jointly owns property in a form and amount sufficient to
establish creditworthiness, a creditor may not require the non-applicant joint owner of
the property to execute any instrument that forfeits or conveys that person's interest in
the property to the applicant or other owners as a condition of credit.
Federal Reserve System, Proposed Rules to Regulation B of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
60 Fed. Reg. 67097-98 (Dec. 28, 1995) (presenting proposed amendments to 12 C.F.R. Part 202)
("December Proposals to Regulation B"). The proposed commentary goes on to give an example
of the clarification: the creditor could not require the spouse of the applicant to quitclaim any
interest in jointly owned property which was relied upon by the creditor to establish
creditworthiness, if the applicant's own interest in the property and other assets would be
sufficient in themselves to achieve creditworthiness. Id. Other proposed amendments include a
clarification of 7(d)(6)-1, which would explicitly state that a creditor can only require that the
partners, officers, or directors of a creditworthy business personally guarantee the credit agree-
ment if the guarantee is not required on a prohibited basis (such as all businesses owned by
women or minorities). Id.
36. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(4).
37. Id.
38. Official Staff Commentaries, 12 C.F.R., Part 202, Supp. I, § 202.7(d)(4).
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Each of the above exceptions requires the creditor to determine
whether the applicant is individually creditworthy and whether the
assets offered by the applicant are owned jointly. Compliance with
the ECOA depends heavily upon performance of these two determina-
tions.39 In commercial lending, the lender may ask for an additional
signature only if the applicant fails to satisfy the lender's standards
for creditworthiness after this opening analysis.40  Financial
institutions may not require the spouse of an interested applicant to
sign a loan instrument otherwise. The lender may, however, restrict
the choice of additional parties, but only insofar as its restrictions do
not discriminate on the basis of marital status or any other prohibited
class within the ECOA.41
Once a creditor disregards the requirements imposed by the
ECOA and wrongfully demands that the spouse co-sign the guaranty,
either spouse may bring a private right of action against the creditor.
Their potential remedies include recovery of actual damages sus-
tained by an aggrieved applicant/ which may include out-of-pocket
expenses, injury to credit or reputation, or emotional distress.
43
Punitive damages may be awarded up to $10,000 for individual ac-
tions, or, in class actions, up to $500,000 or one percent of the credi-
tor's net worth, whichever is less. 44 Finally, reasonable attorney's fees
and court costs are recoverable, with the amount varying according to
the facts of the individual cases.
45
The potential remedy that has become the most powerful and
the most controversial for courts in recent years is that found in
section 169le(c), which allows courts to grant equitable relief as
necessary to enforce the provisions of the ECOA.46 This provision
39. The importance of the creditworthiness analysis includes renewals of credit. One
court used the Official Staff Commentary to § 202.7(d)(5) to require the lender to reevaluate the
creditworthiness of the applicant so that previous guarantors might be released if the applicant
is now individually creditworthy. Failure to perform the reevaluation was considered to be a
violation of the ECOA. Stern, 791 F. Supp. at 869.
40. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1).
41. Official Staff Commentaries, 12 C.F.R., Part 202, Supp. I, § 202.7(d)(5).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a).
43. Anderson, 666 F.2d at 1277. The court concluded that actual damages include "out-of-
pocket monetary losses, injury to credit reputation, and mental anguish, humiliation or embar-
rassment." These injuries must be specifically proven. Id. at 1277-78.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b). See also Anderson, 666 F.2d at 1278 (stating that actual
damages need not be shown before assessing punitive damages but that a court must find, at a
minimum, reckless disregard of the law's requirements).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d).
46. Upon application by an aggrieved applicant, the appropriate United States district
court or any other court of competent jurisdiction may grant such equitable and declaratory
relief as is necessary to enforce the requirements imposed under this title. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c).
12951996]
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appears to grant courts sweeping power to enforce the provisions of
the Act in any manner consistent with the broad purpose of the
ECOA--eliminating discrimination in the credit industry.47  As a
result, some courts have used section 1691e(c) as justification for
releasing a guaranteeing spouse from liability.48 Other courts have
declined to accept this view, stating that authority to order this
extreme result is found in neither the statute itself nor the Official
Staff Commentaries.
49
III. INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
Increasingly, borrowers and guaranteeing spouses are assert-
ing the ECOA as an affirmative defense in efforts to avoid debt liabil-
ity. The characterization of an ECOA action as a compulsory counter-
claim rather than an affirmative defense creates tremendous obsta-
cles for an aggrieved applicant attempting to enforce the Act. If
courts only allow a debtor-defendant to assert a compulsory
counterclaim in response to a creditor's motion for summary
judgment, the guarantor will have to pursue the ECOA claim
separately from the creditor's motion. As a result, the court may
grant summary judgment to the creditor on the defaulted obligation
despite the fact that the guarantor's signature may have been
obtained in violation of the ECOA. Obviously a court's
characterization of the spousal defense will dramatically affect the
guaranteeing spouse's efforts in seeking summary disposition of the
creditor's claim.
47. For excellent discussions of the different results achieved by affirmative defenses and
compulsory counterclaims, see Lustigman and Serafty, 111 Bank. L. J. at 444-48 (cited in note
9); Richard J. Wirth and Jonathan B. Alter, Spousal Defenses Based in Equal Credit Laws, 99
Com. L. J. 93 (1994); Kevin A. Palmer, ECOA, Regulation B, and the Spousal Guaranty, 110
Bank. L. J. 342, 348-49 (1993).
48. See York, 1992 WL 237375 at *3 (noting that rendering the underlying debt void does
not fail as a defense as a matter of law given the broad remedial language of § 1691e(c));
Remington, 19 B.R. at 719 (supporting defensive use of ECOA violation as grounds for
recoupment and leaving open the question as to whether the violation "taints the entire obliga-
tion" with illegality).
49. See, for example, Brinson, 806 F. Supp. at 95 (stating that the ECOA sets forth the
contemplated remedy under the statute in monetary terms); Diamond, 776 F. Supp. at 544
(holding that there is no authority for voiding an entire debt upon a violation of the ECOA).
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A. ECOA Claim as a Compulsory Counterclaim-
Obligation Remains Intact
A creditor will try to preserve a guarantor's obligation by seek-
ing to have the ECOA claim framed as a compulsory counterclaim
instead of as an affirmative defense. A counterclaim forces the
defendant to pursue the claim in a separate action from the creditor's
claim for summary judgment. The creditor will receive a judgment on
the debt immediately, but the compulsory counterclaim will be heard
either after the default judgment or later in a separate court. This is
strategically meaningful for the creditor, who wants to recoup any
losses on the outstanding loan as quickly as possible. More
importantly, the counterclaim cannot be used by the debtor to avoid
repayment of the loan. The aggrieved applicant's only remaining
protection is that the counterclaim or recoupment action may still be
asserted against the creditor in a separate trial and damages assessed
against the violating creditor.
A leading case advocating the position that an ECOA claim
may not be raised by a guaranteeing spouse as an affirmative defense
in response to the enforcement efforts of a creditor on a guaranty is
CMF Virginia Land, L.P. v. Brinson.50 In Brinson, the court limited
the use of the spousal defense by reading the specific damages provi-
sions in 15 U.S.C. sections 1691e(a), (b), and (d) as the only remedies
contemplated under the statute.51 Although section 1691e(c) gives
courts the ability to render a guaranty void should a defendant prove
an ECOA violation, the court held "invalidation of the debt itself [to
be] a remedy too drastic... to implement simply by reading between
the lines of the ECOA."52 The court went on to note that no provision
of the ECOA contemplates an affirmative defense, while the existence
of a defined damage and penalty provision confirms that the
legislative intent was to treat the ECOA as a counterclaim.5
3
The Brinson court acknowledged that in the aggregate, the
damages assessed against the violating creditor through a compulsory
counterclaim could be so large as to have the practical effect of cancel-
ing out the underlying debt. In the court's opinion, however, its ap-
proach was more consistent with the statute, relieving other individ-
50. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. at 93.
51. Id. at 95. The court stated that the plain language of the ECOA only allows an ag-
grieved applicant the ability to bring a "federal civil action for actual damages, punitive dam-
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ual courts from having to answer the difficult question of whether or
not the statute authorizes such "a rather extraordinary remedy" as
nullifying a guarantor's obligation. 54
Contrary to many interpretations of the Brinson decision,55 the
court never addressed the issue of whether only the wives, as
guarantor spouses, could have sought dismissal from the action. In
Brinson, the defendants were a group of couples. The creditor had
required the husbands, who guaranteed certain loans of a general
partnership, to obtain their wives' signatures as guaranteeing
spouses. 56 On these facts, all parties sought to avoid underlying debts
through ECOA claims.
The court recognized that even though the plain language of
the ECOA prohibits discriminatory credit practices against any appli-
cant,57 the original purpose of the ECOA was to protect individually
creditworthy married women from having to obtain the signatures of
their husbands as conditions to credit. Hence the court stated that it
was especially reluctant to render an obligation void "whose execution
violated the ECOA in a manner not expressly targeted by the stat-
ute."58 Apparently, the Brinson court chose to ignore Congress's 1976
54. Id. at 95-96. The court decided that the remedies most "responsibly exercised" under
the ECOA would be to grant the creditor summary judgment for the amount of the guaranty, to
realign the affirmative defense as a compulsory counterclaim so that defendants could try and
prove the ECOA violation at a later trial and possibly receive damages, and finally, to offset the
amount of the guaranty by any damages proven by the defendants at trial. Id. at 95.
55. Paul H. Schieber, Spousal Signatures Revisited (There's Good News and Bad News),
47 Consumer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 364, 364 (1993) (stating that the good news for lenders in consumer
finance law is that a spousal signature violation does not void a spouse's obligation); Leonard A.
Bernstein, An Overview of Selected Recent Developments in Consumer Financial Services Law,
48 Consumer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 22, 24 (1994) (exclaiming that the Brinson court answered the
question of whether illegal spousal guarantees render the obligation void with a "resounding
NO").
56. Brinson, 806 F.Supp at 94. The defendants argued that the requirement of spousal
guarantees as a condition to credit violated Regulation B, rendering the guaranty void and
relieving them of any liability on the underlying debt, or at a minimum, entitling them to
recoupment of damages. Id. A former senior vice president of the financial institution gave
testimony that no creditworthiness analysis was performed prior to the request of additional
spousal guarantees. Unfortunately for the debtors, verification of this fact could not be ad-
dressed until a later trial subsequent to the ruling for summary judgment. Id.
57, Id. at 96.
58. Id. The court noted that Congress enacted the ECOA to prevent the discriminatory
practice of lenders, requiring the husband to guarantee extensions of credit when a credit check
would have shown that the wife had enough assets on her own to achieve creditworthiness
without any additional signature. Id. This court seemed to revolt against the idea that any
man could ever be discriminated against in the credit decision process. It therefore suggested
that the ECOA simply does not apply to men no matter what the plain language of the Act may
seem to indicate to the contrary.
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amendments extending the Act's protection 59 to a wide range of bor-
rowers as a means of protecting the integrity of the guaranty.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, in Diamond v. Union Bank and Trust of Bartlesville,
espoused a view similar to that expressed in Brinson when it held
that a debtor-defendant could not assert an ECOA violation as an
affirmative defense. The court, in granting summary judgment to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, held that neither statutory
language nor case law supported the proposition that an ECOA
violation renders a guaranty void.6 ° Once again, the issue of whether
a guarantor-spouse alone could avoid liability because of an ECOA
violation remained unanswered.
Finally, in 1995, the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas offered an answer to the question of whether a wife
remained liable when a creditor illegally required her guaranty. In
FDIC v. 32 Edwardsville, Inc.,61 the wife argued that the affirmative
defense of an ECOA violation discharged her own liability from the
action. Hers was not an attempt to void the entire debt.6 2 Even so,
the court held that she could not assert an ECOA violation as an
affirmative defense that would invalidate the guaranty. Citing
Brinson and Diamond, as well as several other cases,6 3 the court read
the ECOA's statutory language as not authorizing the voiding of
underlying obligations.6 4
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). See note 23 and accompanying text.
60. 776 F. Supp. at 544. The debtor-plaintiffs alleged that Union Bank required the wife's
additional signature even though she was not a joint applicant with her husband. This court
also cited the purpose of the ECOA, implying that because the husband was the original guar-
antor, no discrimination claim based on the ECOA could be asserted by the husband and the
wife together. Id.
61. 873 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Kan. 1995).
62. Id. at 1480. The court claimed that even though the guaranteeing spouse described
her assertion of an affirmative defense as a recoupment, in reality she was merely trying to use
the ECOA claim as a method of voiding her potential liability on the guaranty. Id. The court
also claimed that the guaranteeing spouse failed to offer enough evidence to suggest that the
corporation would have qualified for the loan without the inclusion of property jointly held by
husband and wife. The court, however, never considered the possibility that the husband's
interest in the jointly held property would be sufficient for creditworthiness standards, negating
the necessity for the wife's signature. Id. at 1481.
63. Id. The court cited Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Linch, 829 F. Supp.
163, 169 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that a defendant may not assert the ECOA as an affirmative
defense), affd 36 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Joseph Hirsch Sportswear Co.,
Inc., 1989 WL 20604 at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1989) (ruling that only a counterclaim, and not a
defense, may be asserted because the ECOA only provides for actual damages as a remedy),
affd, 923 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1990).
64. 32 Edwardsville, Inc., 873 F.Supp at 1480. The court conceded that the ECOA grants
courts the ability to provide equitable and declaratory relief. This court, however, followed the
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Each of these courts, when prohibiting aggrieved applicants
from asserting ECOA affirmative defenses, emphatically declared
that it was following the language of the statute, as well as the intent
of Congress. Both arguments are questionable upon examination of
the actual language of the ECOA65 and the 1976 ECOA amendments
expanding the class of protected consumers. 66 More revealing, how-
ever, is that each of the courts referred to the "drastic" remedy of
voiding an underlying guaranty, that (the courts claimed) would
result if debtors framed an ECOA violation as an affirmative defense.
This language may expose the courts' true motivation-concern for
creditors' inability to recover large outstanding debts. The Brinson
court, like the courts that follow its lead, uses a result-oriented ap-
proach that not only fails to apply the ECOA and punish discrimina-
tory credit practices, but also fails to discern the difference between
releasing only illegally obtained co-guarantors and voiding underlying
obligations.67
B. ECOA Claim as an Affirmative Defense-Releasing Guaranteeing-
Spouses from Liability
More courts in recent years have allowed defendants to treat
ECOA claims as affirmative defenses. In American Security Bank,
N.A. v. York, 68 the federal district court cited the broad language of 15
U.S.C. section 1691e(c)-which grants courts the ability to award
equitable and declaratory relief to enforce the ECOA-when allowing
reasoning of Brinson by holding that this broad power "does not grant courts the power to
invalidate underlying obligations." Id.
65. In particular, examination of 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c), the provision authorizing courts to
grant equitable and declaratory relief, reveals that all potential remedies are not explicitly
stated in the remedial portion of the Act.
66. The original version of this provision prohibited discriminatory credit practices on the
basis of gender or marital status, never stating only women were to receive the benefits of the
Act. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974), codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691. The amendments in 1976 adding race, color, religion, and
national origin prove the extent to which Congress wanted to provide protection to consumers.
Nowhere does this amendment, or its Official Staff Commentaries state that types of
discrimination against all these groups, except of course men, are prohibited classes of
discrimination. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).
67. When a court releases a guaranteeing spouse from her obligation, the underlying debt
is not necessarily declared void. The original guarantor remains liable for the debt to the extent
that person can pay. The courts in such situations are concerned that a creditor will not be able
to recover on the debt because the original guarantor is bankrupt, and if a court releases the
guaranteeing spouse from liability, the creditor will not have the luxury of seeking assets from
any additional parties. See Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 54 F.3d 28, 33
(3d Cir. 1995) ("[I]f plaintiffs guaranty is voided, this would not void the underlying debt
obligation nor any other guaranties").
68. 1992 WL 237375 (D.D.C. 1992).
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defendants to raise their ECOA claim as an affirmative defense. The
York court noted that at least one other court had not let a violation of
the ECOA render the underlying debt void, but pointed out that that
court did not consider section 1691e(c).69 The York court ruled that at
the very least, the ECOA claim entitles a defendant to a recoupment
defense in the form of damages, and perhaps a defense to liability
altogether.70
Another federal district court, in Integra Bank/Pittsburgh v.
Freeman,71 held that the original guarantors (the husbands) could not
be released from their original obligations, but that the co-guaranties
would be unenforceable against their wives.72 In violation of the
ECOA, Integra Bank had required the wives of two corporate princi-
pals to sign the guaranty agreements, as a condition of a $12,000,000
loan.73 The court held that the violation would not shield the princi-
pal guarantors from their obligation on the underlying debt; however,
"an offending creditor should not be permitted to look for payment to
parties who, but for the ECOA violation, would not have incurred
personal liability on the underlying debt in the first instance." 74 Thus,
the court concluded that if the wives could prove that the creditor im-
permissibly required their signatures, the court would use the broad
equitable powers granted it in section 1691e(c) to bar the creditor
from recovering against them on the guaranty. 75
The Third Circuit, in Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor
Fund, L.P.,76 followed the decision in Integra, holding that the two-
year statute of limitations would not bar an affirmative defense to
69. Id. at *3. The York court cited Diamond v. Union Bank of Bartlesville, 776 F. Supp.
542, 544 (N.D. Okla. 1991). The Diamond court found no authority stating that a violation of
the ECOA renders the credit instrument void. 776 F. Supp. at 544.
70. York, 1992 WL 237375 at *3. The court stated that although the Congressional intent
for enacting the ECOA was to protect married women, the plain meaning of the language of the
statute prohibits any type of credit discriminatory practice based on marital status. Id. Looking
to the holding in Remington, the court held that the successful assertion of the ECOA as a
defense supports the award of damages in the nature of recoupment. Id.
71. 839 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
72. Id. at 329.
73. Id. at 328.
74. Id. at 329. When rejecting the line of intent reasoning of the majority of courts, the
Integra court doubted whether Congress really intended for sophisticated creditors to
"affirmatively benefit from proscribed acts of credit discrimination." Id.
75. For a detailed explanation of this case, see Elizabeth C. Yen, An Unlawfully Obtained
Spousal Guaranty May Not Be Enforced by the Creditor, Even Though the Limitations Period for
an Affirmative Claim Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Has Expired, 111 Bank. L. J. 509
(1994).
76. 51 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1995).
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liability for the guaranty. 77 The creditor required Mrs. Silverman to
guarantee a $10,000,000 loan to her husband's company, in violation
of the ECOA78 After the company defaulted on the loan, it agreed to a
bankruptcy reorganization plan which extended the loan and required
that all guaranty obligations remain intact.79 Mrs. Silverman had
moved for injunctive relief in federal court, asking the court to dismiss
her guaranty obligation. The district court had denied relief, instead
granting the creditor's motion to dismiss.80
In contrast, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals first analogized
the ECOA action to usury, securities fraud, and Truth-in-Lending
claims, which are never time-barred as defenses, and concluded that
the debtor-defendant could raise an affirmative defense even though
the statute of limitations would preclude a cause of action. 81 The
court then recognized that the purpose of the Act was to prevent
discrimination and that allowing creditors to benefit from ignoring
the requirements of the ECOA would undermine this Congressional
intent.82 Quoting Integra, the Third Circuit noted that:
This rule places a creditor in no worse position than if it had adhered to the
law when the credit transaction occurred. A creditor may not claim to have re-
lied factually upon a guarantor's assets if it has never requested nor received
financial information regarding them. Further, a creditor may not claim legal
reliance on a signature that was illegally required in the first instance.
88
Accordingly, the Third Circuit summarily rejected the district court's
reasoning that the ECOA was not intended as a defense invalidating
a guaranty.
77. Id. at 32-33. Even though the statute of limitations may have expired on the cause of
action if brought independently, "no such bar exists.. . to the utilization of such grounds as a
defense." Id. at 32. The court recognized this ruling to be similar to other actions that are not
time-barred if brought as defenses rather than separate independent actions. For example, a
guarantor's right to challenge a loan as usurious, an assertion of a securities fraud claim which
is time-barred if an action for judgment on the promissory notes is related to the plaintiffs
claim, and a recoupment claim due to a Truth-in-Lending violation after lender's suit to collect
on loans are three examples of causes of action not affected by the statute of limitations. Id.
78. Id. at 29.
79. Id. at 30.
80. Id. at 28. The district court held that the statute nowhere suggests that relieving the
guaranteeing spouse from the guaranty, and thereby invalidating the guaranty, is a remedy for
an ECOA violation. As a result, Mrs. Silverman could not use the ECOA as an affirmative
defense. Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 857 F. Supp. 447, 453 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
81. Silverman, 51 F.3d at 32.
82. Id. at 33.
83. Id. (quoting Integra, 839 F. Supp. at 329).
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Court decisions treating ECOA claims as affirmative defenses
have been more common in recent years. 8 4 Two recent federal deci-
sions followed the line of reasoning in Silverman and held ECOA
violations of this sort to require the dismissal of a guaranteeing
spouse's obligation on a guaranty. In FDIC v. Medmark, Inc.,85 the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Mrs. Shalberg.
86
Because both her husband's corporation and her husband defaulted
on their guaranties, the lender sued to recover on the wife's
guaranty.87  The court found that the creditor required the wife's
signature even though Mr. Shalberg was independently creditworthy
to guarantee the loan amount.8 8 Consequently, the requirement of a
spouse as co-guarantor warranted the wife's summary disposition and
relief from any obligation on the loan.89
Similarly, in Sharp Electronics Corp. v. Yoggev, 90 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that Mrs. Yoggev could use the Act in a defensive manner, thereby
voiding her liability on the debt, so long as she demonstrated that
Sharp never relied on her creditworthiness when making its initial
decision to make a loan.91 In this case, the plaintiff was not a
financial institution providing a commercial loan, but instead a trade
creditor that sold and serviced Sharp photocopiers to Mr. Yoggev's
company on credit.
92
84. See, for example, Nationsbank v. Sarelson, 31 Va. Cir. Ct. 544 (1992) (setting aside a
confessed judgment entered against guarantors because the guarantors raised an adequate
ECOA defense); First Am. Bank v. McCarty, 29 Va. Cir. Ct. 182 (1992) (holding that a guaranty
obtained in violation of ECOA was void as to wife but not husband) (both of these cases are cited
in Lustigman and Serafty, 111 Bank. L. J. at 448 (cited in note 9).
85. 897 F. Supp. 511 (D. Kan. 1995).
86. Id. at 515.
87. Id. at 514.
88. Id. The court noted that the guaranteeing spouse had never owned any interest in her
husband's corporation, nor had she ever been involved with the operations of the corporation.
Id.
89. Id. at 515. The court cited § 1691e(c) as authority for this action. Additionally, even
though the statute of limitations for bringing an ECOA claim is two years from the date of the
violation, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f), and two years had expired, this court followed the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in Silverman when allowing the guaranteeing spouse to nevertheless obtain
relief from her obligation. Id. at 514.
90. 1995 WL 263533 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 1995).
91. Id. at *2. The court rejected Sharp's argument that as a matter of law, the ECOA
could not be asserted as a defense to void the co-guarantor's underlying debt. Id. at *1.
92. Id. at *1. Mr. Yoggev, as sole shareholder of Duplicating Brokers, Inc. ('DBI"), sold
and serviced Sharp equipment. The note that Mr. and Mrs. Yoggev signed made them jointly
and severally liable should they fail to repay DBI's debt. Id. This fact pattern illustrates the
breadth of the ECOA, which extends beyond areas not covered by the Consumer Credit
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State courts have fallen in line with this latest federal trend.93
In Eure v. Jefferson National Bank,94 the Supreme Court of Virginia
noted that the ECOA's provision for awarding actual and punitive
damages was not the exclusive remedy under the Act.95 The defen-
dant-wife made clear to the court that she was only seeking to have
the guaranty she executed declared unenforceable as to her, as her
guaranty was obtained illegally.96 As in Medmark, the wife in Eure
asserted the defense as a means of placing the entire liability on the
primary debtors. More importantly, the argument against liability
never attempted to void the underlying debt, but only to place the
liability on those who received the benefits of the loan97 The court
held that denying the defendant the "right to use the ECOA violation
defensively would be to enforce conduct that is forbidden by the Act."98
Despite the recent frequency of courts allowing the use of an
ECOA claim as an affirmative defense, thereby dismissing the obliga-
tion of a guaranteeing spouse, the law remains unsettled in this area.
Persuading a court to characterize an ECOA violation as an
affirmative defense may only be half the battle in some cases. Some
courts will not relieve a guaranteeing spouse from liability even if the
affirmative defense is permitted. This is because courts differ in their
definitions of recoupment. At least one court that allowed defendants
to use an affirmative defense, even after the two-year statute of
limitations had passed, described a successful recoupment action as
merely a set-off to the damages sought by the creditor.99 Courts are
Protection Act by encompassing all persons who regularly extend credit. See note 20 and
accompanying text.
93. See, for example, Douglas County National Bank v. Pfeiff, 809 P.2d 1100 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1991) (reversing a summary judgment order entered in favor of bank because defendants
properly raised the ECOA as an affirmative defense); Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp.
v. Naef, 842 P.2d 539 (Wyo. 1992) (holding that when a creditor misrepresented the legal impact
of a wife's signature on her husband's promissory note, and likely committed an ECOA
violation, the note could not be enforced against her).
94. 248 Va. 245, 448 S.E.2d 417 (1994).
95. 448 S.E.2d at 419-20. Once again, a court used the broad language of 15 U.S.C. §
1691e(c) to grant equitable relief. This equitable jurisdiction distinguishes the ECOA from the
Truth-in-Lending Act. Id. at 419.
96. Id. at 419.
97. Id. Mrs. Eure argued that "a fundamental principle of contract law" requires courts to
find contracts that were executed in violation of state or federal law to be unenforceable.
Additionally, she argued that her guarantee was obtained illegally, resulting in a guaranty
agreement contrary to public policy. Id. The court agreed with this argument. Id. at 420.
98. Id. at 421.
99. FDIC v. Notis, 602 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Me. 1992). The court noted that even though an
affirmative claim under the ECOA would be time-barred, the defense in the nature of a
recoupment is not. The court, however, stated in its justification for allowing a recoupment
action that the recoupment was framed as a monetary reduction or offset of the plaintiff-
creditor's claim. Id. See also Brinson, 806 F. Supp. at 95-96.
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starting to void obligations of illegally obtained guaranteeing spouses
with more frequency, however, and as a result, to move toward
implementing Congress's goal of eliminating unjust discrimination in
the credit industry.
IV. THE BETTER APPROACH
Courts continue to struggle to find a balance between the im-
portant competing issues at the heart of this controversy. On one
hand, there is a need to provide credit to all persons who are indi-
vidually creditworthy without discriminating on the basis of race,
gender, or marital status. On the other hand, creditors need, and
should be allowed, to protect their interests by whatever precautions
are reasonably necessary. These competing interests, however, are
not mutually exclusive, as evidenced by the Silverman decision, and
all other decisions implementing the literal language of the ECOA.
Until the Act is applied as it was intended by Congress and courts
reject the line of reasoning in Brinson, discrimination in the credit
industry will continue.
A. Protecting Consumers'Interests
The ability to obtain credit is an integral part of our economic
system and is particularly crucial for small businesses and women. In
fact, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System indicated
to Congress that women business owners comprise at least 3.2 million
businesses in the country and that women start two out of every three
new businesses each year.100 Accordingly, the concern most
articulated to the Board by women's groups and small business
organizations is access to credit in order to establish these new
enterprises and plan for their continued growth and survival. 10 1
Because small business establishments that employ less than 100
employees comprise over fifty percent of net employment growth, 02
the need for Congress to address this concern and to prevent
discriminatory credit practices for all applicants through strict
enforcement of the ECOA is unmistakable.
100. Statement by Martha R. Seger, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage of the Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 697
(Aug. 12, 1986).
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing statistics obtained from the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA)).
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1. Deterring Discriminatory Credit Practices
Without consumer protection devices, the market is nearly
powerless to correct discriminatory credit practices. 0 3 Therefore,
Congress (and society) will only realize its goal of eliminating dis-
crimination against married applicants if courts forcefully punish
creditors who continue to violate the ECOA. When courts only allow
debtors to assert compulsory counterclaims, they preclude guarantee-
ing spouses from contesting liability on the underlying obligations.
Simply awarding damages to the guaranteeing spouse in response to
an ECOA violation, while continuing to enforce the guarantee, does
not produce an effective deterrent to this discriminatory practice.
Especially in the context of a fifty million dollar commercial loan, the
penalty of a few thousand dollars (or even a few hundred thousand
dollars), as a result of a compulsory counterclaim is quite insignificant
when compared to the benefits the creditor receives from collecting on
the entire debt.
Even if the court awards an amount of damages equal to the
amount of the underlying obligation, the guaranteeing spouse may
still be in a worse financial position than he or she would have been in
without the illegal act. Not only will the guaranteeing spouse have to
sacrifice additional time and attorney's fees between the summary
judgment action and the actual trial proving the ECOA violation, but
the guaranteeing spouse also risks future difficulties when seeking
credit individually. The creditor's initial motion for summary
judgment will result in a default judgment against the guaranteeing
spouse, which may remain on that person's credit rating for years to
come. Certain credit reporting bureaus may not draw the connection
between the default judgment on the guarantor's report and the
court's efforts to award enough damages to effectively void the
obligation.
Creditors will continue to violate the law unless courts order
remedies that command the attention of creditors and force them to
take notice of the financial consequences of a violation. A creditor
conducting a cost-benefit analysis recognizes that until the amount of
damages, or the resulting cost of the guaranteeing spouse's dismissal
exceeds the amount earned on the guaranty, economic and profit goals
will prevail over compliance with ECOA requirements. The threat of
103. Page Malliard and Ken Anderson, Women's Banks and Women's Access to Credit-
Competition Between Marketplace and Regulatory Solutions to Gender Discrimination, 20
Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 771, 774-75, 780 (1987).
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courts' releasing guarantors from liability on the underlying debt
supplies creditors with the necessary incentive to conform credit
practices with the requirements of the law.
Some courts criticize the use of an affirmative defense, saying
the remedy produces more of a deterrent than Congress intended.
10 4
These courts cite the literal language of the Act when arguing that
Congress never authorized the "dramatic" remedy of courts dismiss-
ing guarantors from a creditor's motion of summary judgment.15 As
several other courts have noted, however, the broad equitable powers
granted in section 1691e(c) provide courts with the ability to further
the goals of the ECOA by using any necessary equitable action. 10 6 The
argument that because Congress articulated a specific damages
clause, it was therefore the only remedy contemplated, cannot stand.
This argument would require courts to ignore section 1691e(c), a pro-
vision that explicitly acknowledges that Congress could not possibly
foresee all potential remedies, and therefore leaves with the courts
the authority to provide equitable remedies.
2. Enforcement of the ECOA Will Not Reduce Availability of Credit
The credit industry argues that the costs associated with com-
pliance, 07 with provisions such as the ECOA, will be passed along to
consumers through higher interest rates, higher fees, or tougher
credit standards.108 Lenders may contend that if courts consistently
release guarantors from their obligations, financial institutions will
be forced to raise their standards for a creditworthy applicant. The
result of this action, creditors will argue, may actually be to reduce
the overall supply of credit and hurt the people the regulations were
designed to benefit. 0 9  One possible inference from this argu-
104. See, for example, Brinson, 806 F. Supp. at 95; Diamond, 776 F. Supp. at 544; Joseph
Hirsch Sportswear Co., Inc., 1989 WL 20604 at *1, affd, 923 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1990); 32
Edwardsville, Inc., 873 F. Supp. at 1480; Linch, 829 F. Supp. at 169.
105. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. at 95; Diamond, 776 F. Supp. at 544; 32 Edwardsville, Inc., 873
F. Supp. at 1480.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c). See note 12 and accompanying text.
107. The American Bankers Association estimated that the costs of bank regulation were
$10.7 billion annually. John P. Danforth, Who Pays for the High Cost of Excessive Bank
Regulation?, 12 Banking Policy Rep. 1 (May 3-17, 1993).
108. Id. See also George J. Benston, ed., Financial Services, The Regulation of Financial
Services at 52-53 (Prentice Hall, 1983). Benston argues that the costs of lawsuits, compliance
audits, and training credit officers to comply with regulations "must be borne essentially by bor-
rowers." Id.
109. Jack M. Guttentag and Susan M. Wachter, Redlining and Public Policy 43-44 (New
York U., 1980). See also Benston, ed., Financial Services at 53 (cited in note 108) (stating that it
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ment-that creditors perform a great service to consumers when they
discriminate against certain credit applicants-hardly seems logical
or accurate.
According to the ECOA, a creditor may assign any standard of
creditworthiness so long as the standard is uniform and does not
discriminate against any stated class."' Consequently, the credit
industry may argue that if creditors throughout the industry legally
raise their own standards for extending credit, fewer people will
receive credit because fewer applicants will satisfy the new and more
stringent requirements of "creditworthiness" without guarantors. In
fact, industry experts worry that financial institutions are already
reevaluating their pricing standards in response to the recent anti-
discrimination cases previously discussed.,'
Creditors similarly proclaimed the end of easily accessible
credit when liberal bankruptcy reforms increased the availability of
bankruptcy discharge to debtors."2 Some economists refuted the con-
tention that increased bankruptcy would result in increased credit
costs passed along to borrowers by examining the elasticity of the
supply of funds available for lending. These economists suggested
that only if supply were perfectly elastic would increased costs be
placed completely on borrowers."m Fortunately for consumers, review
of empirical evidence indicates that the supply is not perfectly elastic,
and therefore increased lending costs are not necessarily passed along
to consumers."1
4
is "questionable whether consumers are net beneficiaries" of regulations preventing credit
discrimination).
110. Official Staff Commentaries, 12 C.F.R., Part 202, Supp. I, § 202.7(d)(5) (1996).
111. Discrimination Allegations: A Dangerous Trend for '94, 4 Credit Risk Mgmt. Rep.
(Sept. 12, 1994). The article quoted one banking consultant who stated, "[u]nderneath all of this
is that there is a changing definition and changing enforcement of creditworthiness." Id. The
article stated that some bankers feel "[the dominant regulatory challenge the industry is going
to face, probably for the rest of this decade, concerns discrimination." Id.
112. A. Charles Sullivan, Reply: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 Wis. L.
Rev. 1069, 1071-72. When the Bankruptcy Code was revised in 1981, numerous heated debates
surfaced as to the effect this change would have on the banking industry. In particular, discus-
sion centered on the change in the number of bankruptcy filings. For excellent written debates
on the issue, see Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Limiting
Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 1091.
See generally, Sullivan, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. at 1071-72; Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren and
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of
Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 Am. Bankr. L. J. 121 (1994).
113. John H. Moore, Foreword: The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 41 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 1, 5 (1977).
114. Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 Ohio St. L. J.
1047, 1066 (1987). Professor Howard states that "if the supply is not perfectly elastic, creditors
will bear part of these increased costs." Id. Additionally, creditors will bear the entire cost of
increases in bad-debt losses only if the elasticity of supply is zero. Id. Proof that the supply of
SPOUSAL DEFENSE
Additionally, the multiplicity of factors involved in credit
decisions and the wide variety of regulations affecting the credit
industry make it less likely that enforcement of a singular regulatory
act will have the devastating results predicted by creditors. For
instance, states with large exemption laws do not experience higher
costs or decreased availability of consumer credit. 15 Similarly, a
review of states that prohibit wage garnishment reveals no cognizable
difference in the availability and cost of consumer credit." 6 It appears
that creditors are unable to attach financial significance to any one
regulatory provision.
Credit transactions occur within a competitive market. If a
huge pool of credit-seeking applicants are left without the ability to
obtain credit, the market will compensate for this deficiency either by
introducing alternative means of obtaining credit, or by the incursion
of less "established" financial institutions profiting from a readily
available group of customers. In either case, the possibility of
creditors raising the standards for creditworthiness to the point of
pricing themselves out of the market is remote.
B. Protecting Creditors'Interests
Lenders are extremely selective in who will receive credit,
leaving first-time borrowers in need of establishing credit with the
toughest hurdles to cross. However, Congress can hardly expect
lenders to feel a moral obligation to extend credit to all who apply.
Lenders are not investors and have business obligations to their own
depositors to ensure that loans extended will be repaid. As a result,
lenders reasonably want to protect their interests by requiring as
many signatures as necessary to secure the assets provided in a credit
assessment.
1. What the ECOA Actually Prohibits
Protection does not unavoidably require discrimination.
Congress maintained the ability to obtain additional guarantees on
obligations-a creditor's best form of protection against the risk of
default-when it enacted the ECOA. If the applicant fails to satisfy
the lender's creditworthiness standards, the ECOA authorizes the
credit funds is not perfectly elastic can be seen through tax deductions taken as a result of bad-





lenders to require a co-guarantor's signature on the guaranty. The
ECOA merely states that a lender may not discriminate against
married applicants by requiring the spouse to sign as that additional
party,117 except under certain circumstances.18
Even though the law clearly prohibits this unlawful practice,
financial institutions have a long history of requiring the spouse's
signature automatically, " and they continue this practice today.
120 It
seems strange that creditors worry about losing protective measures
when in fact, asking for an additional signature from a non-spouse
demands no more additional effort or cost than asking for the spouse
to co-sign. Perhaps what creditors are really trying to attain is addi-
tional leverage over the original applicant, by forcing a family mem-
ber to co-sign the guaranty. If this is the real complaint of the credit
industry, creditors will have to find some other lawful way of achiev-
ing this end.
If, however, the true reason for creditors' desire to obtain the
additional signature of a family member is the concern that one
spouse will transfer all the assets of the family to the other spouse,
then creditors need look no further than the law of fraudulent
conveyances for their protection. Even though an individual generally
has the right to dispose of personal property at any time, the owner
may not do so if the intent is to infringe the right of another person.'2 '
For instance, if a debtor ignores the right or equity of its creditors,
and disposes of his property with the intent to delay or defraud his
creditors, "a court will void the conveyance of property and set it
aside." 22  This is the classic definition of fraudulent transfer or
conveyance.
For instance, a guarantor who realizes that the debt cannot be
repaid may attempt to transfer the entire deed to his spouse in the
hope that the creditor will not be able to reach the property in the
creditor's collection action. Due to the laws of fraudulent conveyance,
however, the court will rule the transfer invalid and the property will
117. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5) (stating that an "applicant's spouse may serve as an additional
party, but the creditor shall not require that the spouse be the additional party").
118. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1). The exceptions to the general rule include joint applicants and
unsecured credit requests in community property states. Id.
119. Geary, 31 Bus. Law. at 1641 (cited in note 5).
120. See Tripping Over Reg B Cosigner Rules, 4 Reg. Compliance Watch (Mar. 7, 1994)
('The Equal Credit Opportunity Act has been a law for 19 years, but the record shows that
bankers continue to find themselves violating the spousal signature provision of the stat-
ute.... 151 banks of all sizes [were] in violation of Section 202.7(d)... during the period from
July 1, 1992, to June 30, 1993.").




remain as an asset of the guarantor. This law protects a creditor's
interest and eliminates the need to bind any and all family members
to the credit agreement. Therefore, creditors should not ask Congress
or courts to apply the ECOA in a manner that prevents the risk of
illegal transfers from one spouse to the other when other laws already
exist to protect against such action.
2. The Effect of the Affirmative Defense on Creditors
As discussed above, when a guaranteeing spouse asserts an
affirmative defense based upon an ECOA violation, that person's
obligation on the guaranty should be nullified. It may not seem plau-
sible at first, but this remedy leaves the creditor in the same economic
position as if the creditor had initially followed the requirements of
the Act. If the applicant had met the standards for creditworthiness
and had not been married, then the creditor would not have required
an additional signature. Therefore, releasing a spouse from liability
on the underlying obligations puts the creditor in the same position as
if the creditor had extended credit to a single applicant. As stated by
the Third Circuit in Silverman, "a creditor may not claim legal
reliance on a signature that was illegally required in the first
instance."'123  This is the most effective articulation of why courts
should consistently allow a guaranteeing spouse, who was illegally
forced to co-sign a guaranty, to seek summary judgment and release
from liability on the obligation. By doing so, courts not only realize
the purposes of the ECOA, but also apply the law as drafted by
Congress.
Courts that have allowed a debtor-defendant to assert an
ECOA violation as an affirmative defense cite strong policy argu-
ments, in conjunction with the underlying purpose of the ECOA, for
that decision. Cases such as Integra contend that any remedy im-
posed due to a violation should not allow creditors who disregard the
requirements of the ECOA to reap the benefits of such a practice. 124
123. Silverman, 54 F.3d at 329. The court in Integra similarly stated that:
[While an ECOA violation should not void the underlying credit transaction an
offending creditor should not be permitted to look for payment to parties who, but for
the ECOA violation, would not have incurred personal liability on the underlying debt in
the first instance. This rule places a creditor in no worse position than if it had adhered
to the law when the credit transaction occurred.
Integra, 839 F. Supp. at 329.
124. Integra, 839 F. Supp. at 329 ("To permit creditors--especially sophisticated credit
institutions-to affirmatively benefit by disregarding the requirements of the ECOA would




Without a potent remedy for these unlawful and extremely common
practices, creditors will simply ignore the Act, hoping that the couple
will not discover the law until after the spouse has already signed. By
then, the creditor only risks that damages may be assessed as a set-
off to the enormous obligation remaining intact. Congress did not
intend for courts to perpetuate gender-based and marital-based
discrimination in this manner when it enacted the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act.
V. CONCLUSION
When a creditor requires a creditworthy married applicant to
obtain a spousal guaranty of an obligation, that creditor has discrimi-
nated against the applicant with respect to marital status, a protected
class under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. More importantly,
when the creditor violated the ECOA, the creditor obligated a spouse
to a guaranty who would not have incurred personal liability but for
this violation. Congress enacted the ECOA to eliminate discrimina-
tory credit practices, not to provide creditors with huge rewards for
disregarding the requirements of the Act. Courts that permit a
spousal guarantor to assert an affirmative defense to a creditor's
motion for summary judgment, thereby releasing the spouse from any
obligation on the underlying debt, apply the ECOA as Congress
intended and move closer to the goal of eradicating discrimination in
the credit industry.
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